

12 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller

SUBJECT : Briefing Notes on the DDI and
OSI/DD/S&T (January 1964)

1. The attached compilation of notes on various DDI programs (supplemented by OSI) supersede the preliminary write-ups provided as material suitable for use by Mr. McCone in briefing the President on Agency activities.

2. We have arranged one copy in looseleaf form for the Director's convenience. Except for perhaps OCI coverage, which highlights the services provided to the White House, the notes may be found useful for other purposes without change.

3. Under separate cover, I am forwarding a supplement expanding on certain activities of NPIC and the [redacted] Research program of ORR.

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[redacted]
PAUL A. BOREL
Assistant Deputy Director
Intelligence/Management

Attachments

1. Briefing Notes
2. Supplement (USC)

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**BRIEFING NOTES ON
THE INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
AND OSI/DD/S&T**

January 1964

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I. Functions and Products of the Directorate of Intelligence

1. The Directorate of Intelligence is the Agency's arm for the evaluation, analysis, and dissemination of all finished intelligence at the national level [REDACTED] [REDACTED] It is responsible for preparing, and getting into the right hands, issuances in the fields of current intelligence, national estimates, photographic interpretation, economic analysis, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and for conducting a number of other supporting services essential to an adequate national intelligence effort.

2. The Directorate's personnel engage in a wide variety of ad hoc intelligence support to the White House, the NSC, and other policy-making consumers -- in written form, participation in task forces and committees, and in less formal ways.

3. The following brief notes are designed to present a picture of the main functions of the Intelligence Directorate.

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1. Early Warning

The first line of intelligence defense of national security is the earliest possible warning of impending trouble -- or sudden opportunity. This requires not only the speediest possible communications, but also the most systematic coverage of possible sources of danger or opportunity, to make as sure as humans and machines can that nothing is overlooked, that analytical skills are brought to bear on evidence as rapidly as possible, and that all offices of the government having responsibility for national security matters are kept fully aware of impending developments, and contribute to assessments of the meaning of these for the nation.

2. The early warning functions of the DD/I are, of course, implicit in a number of current intelligence and other issuances; certain special mechanisms have, however, been established to meet particular needs in this field -- the Critic system of rapid communication and the National Indications Center (NIC).

3. Critic. As a result of difficulties encountered in getting critical intelligence to Washington during the Turkish-Syrian crisis in the fall of 1957, the Intelligence Community

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has devised a special handling and communications system for the transmission of all critical intelligence to Washington. It has been the goal of the Intelligence Community to get all information that might need the immediate attention of the President into the hands of responsible intelligence analysts within ten minutes of the preparation of the original report anywhere in the world. As a result of the operations of the Critic system, as the special system is called, approximately 61% of such messages transmitted during FY 1963 were actually received in Washington in 10 minutes or less. Nearly all of the remaining 39% were originated at reporting posts that do not have immediate access to the main communications nets designed to provide this rapid service. Despite the fears of some of the founders, the Critic System has rarely been misused for lower priority transmissions and remains after 5 years of use a remarkably efficient high-speed system.

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2. Current Intelligence: OCI
The President's Intelligence Checklist
The Bulletin

A. In fulfillment of its responsibilities for monitoring developments throughout the world, and ensuring that the President and other government officials are notified of critical developments at once, the Agency has set up the Office of Current Intelligence -- organized to receive the massive flow of daily reports from all over the world on an all-source basis, and to select significant matters from this flow for prompt evaluation, analysis, and dissemination.

B. The President's Intelligence Checklist is this office's most important product. The Checklist is prepared by a small group of highly trained intelligence officers who, of course, have the assets of the entire office at their disposal in selecting and analyzing reports which, in their judgment, warrant Presidential attention. The Checklist -- to ensure that it is current -- is held for printing until just before its morning delivery to the White House.

C. A key element in the current intelligence operation is the CIA Watch Office. This group of experienced men maintains a clock-around watch, monitoring incoming reports received by courier, teletype, and telephone from all sources. It is connected by secure communications lines with the White House

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and with all other member departments and agencies of the intelligence community. The Watch Office furnishes those preparing the Checklist with pertinent information as it is received. It also assists by consulting appropriate experts and other agencies to obtain their evaluation of current developments.

D. The chief of OCI early each morning briefs the Director of Central Intelligence on new developments which occurred overnight and on changes in continuing important situations such as Cuba and the Berlin access issue. As developments warrant during the day, the OCI chief, of course, keeps the DCI informed.

E. Apart from the Checklist, OCI produces daily and weekly publications for a wider circle of recipients. The Central Intelligence Bulletin is the publication for current intelligence service to the National Security Council. It is coordinated to the degree that time permits in daily meetings at CIA headquarters where drafts of proposed articles prepared by CIA analysts are reviewed in consultation with representatives of the USIB agencies. The Current Intelligence Weekly Review is a roundup of the week's important developments throughout the world. Disseminated along with the Review are Special Reports, articles which examine matters of great current interest in greater depth. Both the daily Bulletin and the weekly Review include material derived from communications intelligence and

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other highly sensitive sources. The office also prepared daily and weekly publications based on less sensitive materials for distribution to wider audiences.

F. Almost daily, the President's Checklist and some of the other current publications generate requests for background information, additional facts, briefings or answers to specific questions. The current intelligence staff is almost continuously engaged in responding to such requests, usually on short notice.

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3. National Intelligence Estimates

A. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) present the views on the big questions of the Director of Central Intelligence and his colleagues, the intelligence chiefs of the Departments and Agencies who compose the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). These estimates are brief documents, having as their essence judgments about unknown or unknowable aspects of present situations and future trends. They are not detailed reports or factual studies in depth. They seek to take up where hard and clear facts leave off.

B. The subject matter of National Estimates is selective, depending on national policy needs. It ranges from regular, annual papers like the two on which the NSC was recently briefed -- "Soviet Bloc Air and Missile Defense Capabilities Through Mid-1967" (NIE 11-3-63), and "Soviet Capabilities for Long Range Attack" (NIE 11-8-63) -- to less technical problems which may or may not receive annual consideration. Recent examples of the latter are "The Malaysian-Indonesian Conflict" (NIE 54/55-63), "Algeria" (NIE 62-63), and "Problems and Prospects in Communist China" (NIE 13-63).

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C. In a normal year, between fifty and eighty National Intelligence Estimates are undertaken and approved by the USIB. Most of them are scheduled well in advance in order to permit adequate research, analysis, and coordination. When required, however, special national estimates can be (and have been) called for and completed in a matter of a few hours. Selection of problems and procedures for preparing the estimates reflect the following criteria:

(1) Subject matter is of practical interest and importance to policy-making at the national level. The schedule of projected NIE's is cleared quarterly with the White House staff and other interested agencies.

(2) Subject matter is of the kind on which a coordinated, national view is considered useful. Many problems are more properly dealt with through departmental intelligence issuances and procedures.

(3) Preparation of the estimate involves contributions from all intelligence agencies having a concern and a competence in the subject. The final product, however, is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence. Where a significant difference of opinion persists, however, it is not papered over but defined in a footnote of dissent.

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D. The Director's executive agent for preparing NIE's is the Board of National Estimates, a group now numbering twelve senior officers of varied academic, legal, military or Foreign Service experience. The Board is supported by a small staff of professional estimators, which together with the Board, make up the Office of National Estimates. The Office has been in existence since 1950, when it was established by General Smith, then DCI, and it has subsequently presided over preparation of more than 700 National Intelligence Estimates. The Board is a unique institution in that no other intelligence service in the world maintains a body of high-level officers, relieved of administrative concerns, whose professional lives are entirely devoted to studying and trying to provide answers to the gut questions of national security.

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4. The National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC)

I. Background and Mission

NPIC was established to serve as a single, national level center for exploitation of photography acquired in the various reconnaissance collection programs in support of the national intelligence effort. The Center functions under the executive direction of CIA and is jointly manned by CIA and DOD personnel.

Organized photographic intelligence activities have been in operation in the Agency for more than 10 years, and became big business in the mid-fifties, with the receipt of large volumes of high altitude photography. By 1958, the need of the entire US intelligence effort for rapid study and interpretation of the large volume of photography covering previously denied areas in the Soviet Bloc led to further expansion of the Agency's photographic intelligence organization. It was designated the CIA Photographic Intelligence Center, with elements of Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence jointly participating. In 1961, by action of the President at the request of the DCI, and as a result of earlier recommendations of the Joint Study Group on US Intelligence Activities, the NPIC was formally established in its present form.

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II. Activities and Accomplishments

Primary emphasis is placed on the immediate readout, analysis, and reporting of reconnaissance photography. This first phase reporting is accomplished on an around-the-clock basis, and covers priority national intelligence objectives. Second and third phase photographic interpretation follows in order to provide a complete index of the mission coverage and detailed photographic analysis of targets of priority national interest. In all these efforts, extensive use is made of collateral information from other intelligence sources.

In addition, NPIC conducts a wide range of other photographic intelligence services in support of the national intelligence effort, including photographic laboratory services, preparation of briefing boards and other graphic services, printing and publication of the highly classified photographic interpretation reports prepared in the Center, photographic measurement and photogrammetric support, maintenance of a computer facility to support the photographic measurement program as well as the document storage, retrieval and rapid printout of photographic intelligence reports, and a complete range of collateral research and library reference services. It is responsible for promoting an integrated and interdepartmental effort in the exploitation of photography for intelligence purposes, including the exchange of photographs and photographic data with other collection components in the intelligence community, coordination of compatible codes, indexes, and mechanized systems for the efficient recovery, collation, and collection of photographic data throughout the intelligence community; and maintenance of a consolidated central file of photographic data.

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NPIC is actively engaged in the technical development of specialized equipment, techniques and materials primarily through R&D contractual arrangements with commercial concerns, with the current level of active contracts [REDACTED] These technical development programs are engaged in or sponsored jointly with the military services and have resulted in significant savings for the US Government. In the interests of economy, the Center provides information about its specialized equipment to interested elements of the intelligence community for their own use, and sponsors interagency exchanges of technical information of this kind.

Beginning in the summer of 1956, photographic analysis began to provide urgently needed information on foreign missile test sites,

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production programs, the size and deployment of enemy military resources, detailed studies on industrial production complexes, and other items of priority national intelligence interest. As a result of the highly valuable information being derived from photographic interpretation, heavy emphasis has been placed on the development of new collection programs which deliver to the Center mounting volumes of high quality photography.

One of NPIC's most significant accomplishments was in connection with the Cuban crisis. It was in NPIC that the original Soviet missile threat in Cuba was discovered and the word first flashed to the Director of Central Intelligence and the White House. The stepped-up reconnaissance

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25X1 program of Cuba, which continues today, had resulted by December 1963 in over [] of photographic inputs to the Center which were rapidly analysed and photographic interpretation reports produced for the daily consumption of US Government officials. For its outstanding achievements during the Cuban Crisis NPIC was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation by President Kennedy.

Throughout its history the Center has carried on an extensive briefing program to provide the top echelon of US Government officials with the latest information derived from the photographic interpretation effort.

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5. Economic Intelligence and the Office of Research
and Reports

Underlying our efforts to learn the intentions and capabilities

25X6 must be a sophisticated appreciation of foreign economies. Economic intelligence is defined in CIA to include not only conventional economic subjects but also certain military-economic questions of critical concern to US national security, i.e., research, analysis, and estimates on Soviet weapons production and deployment, systems costing, and economic feasibility estimating.

Responsibility for economic intelligence, thus broadly defined, is in the hands of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR).

For a number of years, by agreement with the State Department, ORR has been charged with primary responsibilities for intelligence coverage on the Sino-Soviet Bloc, Free World matters being handled principally by the Department. Nonetheless, a rising number of requests for research on non-Bloc economic matters has forced ORR to broaden its efforts.

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The functions of this Office fall generally into two main categories -- support to national policy-making, and support to Agency and Departmental operations.

A. Support to National Policy-Making

This function is carried out in ways best described through examples:

Currently, our economic analysts are working very closely with the military officers in the Defense Intelligence Agency on re-evaluating the evidence with respect to the size and probable effectiveness of the Soviet ground forces. We in CIA have undertaken leadership on this project, at the request of Secretary McNamara, and with the full cooperation of his staffs. The results are reflected in the annual national intelligence estimate on Soviet ground forces. The results are also used in the very long-range projections of Soviet military forces (5 to 10 years) which are conducted by the CIA/DIA Joint Analysis Group, which the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence established some time ago.

Both these methods of assessing present and future Soviet military forces draw on the professional expertise available in

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the Pentagon, and also subject purely military judgments to independent review of the evidence from all sources. In addition, they apply tests of fiscal feasibility to all projections of likely Soviet weapons systems: can the Soviets possibly afford the military forces being projected, and if adopted, what other Communist goals must suffer or fall by the wayside as a consequence?

The last three years have also brought a sharp increase in requests for special studies, in support of national policy problems, in the more conventional economic intelligence fields. Examples of ORR's work in this field in recent months include:

(1) A series of presentations to senior officials of the White House, State and Defense Departments, on the growing problems of resource allocation within the Soviet Union, Soviet gold reserves, and the agricultural crisis.

(2) Participation in Mr. Sorensen's group concerned with developing an Administration position on the question of US sales of wheat to the USSR and the European Satellites. Our contributions covered an evaluation of Soviet and Satellite needs for additional grain supplies.


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(3) An evaluation of current trends and future prospects for the Cuban economy immediately in the wake of Hurricane Flora and in response to a White House request.


(4) The preparation of a special report for the White House Staff and Under Secretary Ball covering the USSR's need for trade credits, to include an estimate of the internal impact of various possible levels of credits on the Soviet economy, and on the resultant impact on Bloc economic maneuverability in the Free World.

(5) Spot requests from high level policymakers, and occasionally from Committees of Congress through the Executive Branch, recently led to quick studies on the economic effects on

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 and a response to Chairman Vinson's request for an evaluation of the use and abuse by Soviet trawlers of the right of "innocent passage" through US territorial waters.

(6) The representative of CIA who meets daily with the White House Staff not only feeds in reports and information

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relevant to current policy considerations, but also carries back requests requiring special study. For example, as the crisis developed on the Sino-Indian border last fall there were a number of critical questions troubling the White House Staff which called for research by our Economic Office. These involved, for example, the question of China's logistic capabilities on India's northern borders; possible impact of a Sino-Soviet war on the economy of the two countries; and, the extent of China's dependence on the USSR for its vital petroleum supplies. Because these concerns were raised promptly by the White House Staff, we were able to complete our studies on these questions in time to present them to Governor Harriman and members of his delegation before they departed for New Delhi.

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Requests for [] economic intelligence

nature come primarily from []

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[] the Departments of State and Commerce []

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Economic defense support is given on virtually a daily basis to the operating offices charged with carrying out export control

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programs against the Soviet Bloc, Communist China, and Cuba. Such support includes the identification of strategic machinery, components, and materials of important military advanced technology significance; the evaluation of the impact on the Bloc of denial of Free World products; the identification of Western manufacturers or commercial firms engaged in supplying machinery, components, and materials to Communist countries in contravention of controls.

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7. Scientific and Technical Analysis and the
Office of Scientific Intelligence

The post World War II scientific and technological revolution and the directly related development of advanced weapons have brought about a corresponding revolution in scientific intelligence. Almost totally new methods of technical collection and analysis have now been added to the more conventional intelligence practices. While it is centralized with other Agency scientific and technical functions under the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology (DDS&T), the Office of Scientific Intelligence performs the same functions in the fields of science and technology as do DD/I components in the political and economic spheres. The nature of OSI's intelligence function is best described by covering (a) scientific intelligence objectives, (b) OSI organization and methods, and (c) the role of external contracting.

Scientific Intelligence Objectives

Policy makers' demands in the S&T intelligence field center on three primary areas. These are: (a) Soviet, Chinese Communist and Cuban military capabilities with particular reference to Soviet and Chinese nuclear delivery capabilities and their development of new weapons systems; (b) critically important scientific and technical developments in Communist countries; and (c) non-Communist Bloc nuclear energy, guided

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missile and other advanced weapon systems research and development. The office organization reflects these objectives directly; the work plan has been geared to determining foreign progress in these areas, and the results of OSI research support and have supported national policy makers and agency operations directly over the years and especially in the past year.

As examples, OSI, in support of the DD/S&T, the DD/I and the DCI, participated in numerous briefings of members of Congress and the Executive Branch on the subject of Soviet nuclear capabilities prior to the signing of the recent test ban agreement. Office briefings and studies on the Soviet space program have been an integral part of U.S. deliberations on the pace and goals of our own program. Studies over the past year on Soviet hydroacoustic research in support of their anti-submarine warfare program have been of considerable importance to our military planners in attempting to determine Soviet capabilities to counter our Polaris fleet. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Energy found the OSI study of Soviet nuclear warheads for missiles to be of great value in preparing a special briefing for the President. Office analyses on Soviet and Chinese Communist accomplishments in the basic and life sciences gave our planners insight on Communist Bloc capabilities to support the development of new advanced or "exotic" weapons.



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The overriding importance of OSI's intelligence objectives are best explained by the fact that any nation's development of advanced weapons must rest first on its capabilities in the basic and applied sciences. OSI's research to meet these objectives ranks with the most critical undertaken within CIA.

OSI Organization and Methods

To accomplish its intelligence objectives OSI is organized on a dual basis. Three divisions are responsible for the analysis and reporting of foreign military research and development in the fields of atomic energy, chemical and biological warfare, guided missiles and space, and defensive systems to include anti-ballistic missile, air defense, and anti-submarine warfare systems. Two divisions are responsible for foreign developments in the basic sciences and the life sciences. While the demands of S&T intelligence consumers are greatest in the foreign weapons research and development fields, their requests for information on foreign basic science capabilities are numerous for, to date, no nation without a sound, extensive and sophisticated scientific base has been able to develop unilaterally weapons

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of mass destruction. The two office efforts are mutually compatible if not absolutely essential to one another. The inter-relations between the two research areas illustrate the blending of traditional scientific intelligence operations with those brought about by the post-World War II scientific revolution.

Office analysts working in the basic and life sciences use sources of information that are traditional or conventional.

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are all utilized. In contrast, the divisions following foreign military research and development are using the new technical collection and analysis methods developed and deployed in recent years.

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
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External Contracting

The scientific and technological explosion of the last decade has placed the scientific intelligence analyst in a difficult position; that of keeping up with the pace of developments in his field and simultaneously doing a full-time intelligence job. In addition, the scientific revolution is no longer limited to the USSR and the leading Western nations.

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makers must be kept informed of the S&T of the new countries as well as the old. The number of professionals in OSI has remained about the same over the last decade. The Office has, therefore, turned to external contractors to have many research jobs done.

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8. The National Intelligence Survey and the Office of Basic Intelligence

A. World War II involved painful experience with critical gaps, frequent disagreement or duplication in basic, factual information about foreign countries -- military geography, transportation and data on telecommunications, sociological, political, economic, scientific, and military features. In view of these deficiencies, one of the first National Security Council Directives (NSCID No. 3 - 1948) established the National Intelligence Survey (NIS) to provide coordinated, comprehensive intelligence on the relatively unchanging characteristics of foreign areas, worldwide. The USIB recently re-examined and brought up to date the NIS mission. Primary responsibility for processing and publishing this series rests with CIA's Office of Basic Intelligence (OBI).

B. The published NIS on each foreign country or area is a digest which is comprehensive in scope and generally of the depth of detail appropriate for high-level policy and planning purposes (although, for example, circumstances at the time of the 1958 Lebanon landings made NIS a principal source for initial operational requirements for the forces in the Mediterranean). The objective of the NIS is to be at hand when needed, rather than being produced on a crisis or crash basis. The one-volume General Survey is the primary NIS unit published on an area. This may be the entire NIS coverage for one of the smaller

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countries. For larger countries the General Survey is selectively supplemented by other NIS units when appropriate to provide the more extensive coverage required by such topics as Coasts & Landing Beaches, Ports & Naval Facilities, Characteristics of the People, and Health & Sanitation. With initial world coverage essentially completed, NIS emphasis is now on issuance of updated revisions as rapidly as permitted by capabilities. Scheduled BY 1965 production will put General Survey updating for principal countries on a 2 to 3 year cycle.

C. Production of NIS utilizes the specialized know-how and production capabilities of Government components not only in the Intelligence Community and the services but such others as Agriculture, Commerce, HEW, Interior, and Labor. Some 40 individual components are involved in production of NIS topics allocated according to their specialized fields, which process provides basic building blocks for other forms of intelligence. The published NIS is the top of a pyramid of detailed information which remains in the hands of producing components and is available for their specialized needs.

D. The programming and accomplishment of NIS coverage is coordinated by the interagency NIS Committee, a USIB committee whose members represent both the requirements and production capabilities of the agencies. From the outset the DCI and CIA have been responsible for management of the Program and publi-

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cation of the NIS, and a number of CIA components contribute portions of the content. OBI performs the coordinative and final review and processing of the materials.

E. More than 6,500 NIS units have been published to date, an increasing proportion being in maintenance revisions. More than 2,800,000 copies of these various units have been published. In addition, to the dissemination of NIS units, stocks are maintained and are heavily drawn on when crises emerge. In addition to these stocks and complete NIS held by a number of users, master copies of all printed NIS content and supporting maps and other graphic materials are held in protected storage for emergency reprinting at a remote plant which is under contingency contract.

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B. The Collection Guidance Staff

1. The Collection Guidance Staff was organized to bring the analyst and his needs together with the collector and his abilities to meet those needs. It is organized according to the three broad types of collection in the community: signals intelligence, reconnaissance, and human sources. Having access to, and detailed knowledge of, the working of the various collection systems within these three groups, the Collection Guidance Staff is able to dissect information problems and assign the parts to those assets best able to deal with them. Likewise, the Staff can pass to the analyst accurate and complete inventories of the kinds of collection that are at work or could be put to work on the area or topic of prime concern to the analyst. The Staff also supports the work of a number of USIB subcommittees, such as COMOR, the SIGINT Committee, CCPC, and IPC, and in the case of the USIB analysis committees, such as GMAIC, JAEIC and others, the Staff can take their requirements and translate them into terms that can be dealt with by the collection world.

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2. In order to carry out its functions around the clock the Staff maintains an Operations Center whose Action Officers are able to stimulate collection in the name of the Staff by any of the collection assets the Staff deals with during normal duty hours. This means that on any urgent overnight problem the Action Officer is able to support the substantive intelligence watch by tapping the communications facilities and the collection assets of the entire community to insure that all we need to know about the development is available to the DCI promptly and as completely as possible.

3. The Operations Center also has the mission of providing for the Agency counterpart services to that provided the Secretary of Defense by the National Military Command Center in the Pentagon, and to the Secretary of State's Operations Center. This means that the DCI will now have available to him in one place current information on US forces, deployments, plans and intentions, and the gist of diplomatic and military policy decisions. As the scope of the Intelligence Community concerns broaden beyond the Sino-Soviet Bloc with the end of a bi-polar balance of forces, intelligence problems are more and more affected by US military and diplomatic actions. It is essential,

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therefore, that intelligence judgments take into account this impact and that the DCI have available to him the fullest information on what we are doing so that he can understand the reactions of the other side.

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IV. Other Services

In the complexities of the modern world, a US national intelligence effort, if it is to provide sophisticated service of high quality, must be something like an iceberg -- much of it lies beneath the surface of the visible finished product. This is the case with a number of activities in the Directorate of Intelligence which are conducted in support of Agency intelligence programs or, under the "services of the common concern" clause, on behalf of the intelligence community as a whole. The following paragraphs describe the highlights of certain of these services.

A. Information Processing and the Office of Central Reference

Between the collection and production phases of the intelligence cycle is information processing, which includes the receipt, dissemination, exploitation, indexing, storage and retrieval of the great volumes of data which must be sifted for relevance to intelligence problems and policy support. Within CIA, responsibility for such information processing, on an all-source basis, has been centralized in the Office of Central Reference (OCR).

The combination of the "information explosion" and the need for quick reaction to missile-age requirements for information support constitutes a challenge to the information systems of the community.

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Intensive efforts to improve these systems are being made in conjunction with computer developments, microminiaturization, automatic language manipulation, and the like. OCR plays a central role in such developmental efforts for the intelligence community, and has provided, for example, the Chairman and Secretariat for the US Intelligence Board's Committee on Documentation (CODIB), which is charged, among other duties, with encouraging development of compatible information systems within CIA, DOD, State, and other USIB member agencies. The CODIB Staff for the Community Information Processing Study (SCIPS), authorized by USIB, has completed an intensive investigation of information processing in the intelligence community and has submitted its Stage I Report to CODIB. This community-supported study was undertaken with the substantial administrative support of OCR and the over-all direction of the AD/CR as Chairman of CODIB.

Machine and Document Control. OCR's document control activities center in a Machine Division with its punch card, optical and other equipment, and a Document Division, which provides quick distribution of information of current interest, plus subject/area indexing for subsequent retrieval of information. The Document Division

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also has the Agency's Top Secret Control responsibility and central
Top Secret document file, plus production responsibility for the




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The Libraries. The Agency's memory is in the CIA Library
and four specialized libraries, or registers, dealing with biographic,
graphic (motion pictures and ground photography), foreign installation
and special codeword (COMINT/TKH) data. The CIA Library contains
(1) microfilm copies of the raw information reports originating with
CIA, the Foreign Service, DOD, and other collectors, (2) finished
intelligence reports, and (3) a selected and constantly updated
collection of books, periodicals, newspapers and journals.

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To keep pace with shifts in interests in industrial and foreign installations information, OCR's 16 year old Industrial Register has been reconstituted, reducing the staff from [] persons, and the files from []

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[] folders; these files will now include open source, collateral and codeword information, to support more effectively the COMOR and NPIC customers and such high priority production efforts as the DIA/CIA Soviet mapping project, among others.

All-Source Document Files. The all-source foreign installations files represent one specialized priority interest; on a broader subject/area basis, the Special Register maintains machine control over all the special channels codeword material received by CIA. These documents are indexed in depth and microfilmed for subsequent retrieval; card files on special materials number nearly 20 million items.

Exploitation of Foreign Language Periodicals and Publications. The Foreign Documents Division (FDD) of OCR reads foreign language periodicals and publications from all parts of the world, and as a service of common concern extracts information of priority interest from them, in accordance with DCID 2/4. Its products are disseminated to consumers within the intelligence community and also to other

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departments of the government.

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FDD receives a daily average of [] publications, and scans

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about [] pages a day in more than [] languages. It meets

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regularly with consumer offices to make sure that its output is

responsive to their specific requirements. Illustrative samples of its

products include weekly coverage of significant scientific and technical

developments in the Communist Bloc, as gleaned from Bloc literature;

daily reportage on international Communist activities reflected in

foreign press and periodicals; and daily reports on insurgency

and counterinsurgency activities in specified areas.

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B. Cartographic Services

1. In CIA the preparation of maps plays a significant role in intelligence production. Over maps and charts a year are prepared. Of particular note is the support given to the areas of geographic and economic intelligence, scientific intelligence, National Estimates, current intelligence, operations, and basic intelligence. Cartographic support also is given to the Department of State.

3. We also maintain a comprehensive Map Library, which includes political, sociological, economic, and topographic maps

4. The major users of the Map Library include the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

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C. The Research Staff of the DD/I

1. CIA, in processing the volume of information obtained by our government on foreign affairs, is necessarily organized along functional and regional lines. It must respond, however, to problems which often ignore functional and regional lines. Hence, the organization is in a continuing adjustment in order to respond to a given problem as a whole.

2. The Research Staff was set up as an organizational adjustment to a difficult and fundamental problem which required continuous and concentrated research over a prolonged period of time in order to provide the Agency with the soundest substantive foundation for its daily responses. The problem was Sino-Soviet relations. Because of the importance of the problem and because of the complexities and uncertainties inherent in it, particularly in the early stages of the Sino-Soviet dispute when the entire matter was obscured by the Communists' concern to maintain appearances and when there was no body of hard evidence which could sustain analysis in competition with speculation, we detailed a few experienced analysts of Communist thought and practice as a Research Staff to examine the problem in great depth, freeing them from the responsibility for daily production to devote all of

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their time to painstaking analysis of the relation between Moscow and Peiping. The result was a series of definitive studies over a period of years which were indispensable in keeping the Agency and our government on the right track in interpreting the developing situation long before the dispute erupted into the open and became public property. The research drew on the work of the entire organization of the Agency but at the same time made independent analyses from all of the primary sources available, including the esoteric language of the two Communist parties in their statements journals and newspapers.

3. The research Staff continues the study of Sino-Soviet relations and related problems of Sino-Soviet competition, as e.g., their competition for influence in Cuba. It also works in the field of Communist strategic doctrine, with emphasis on Soviet doctrine as expressed in the interplay between military and political leaders, and does studies on Chinese Communist affairs.

4. In addition to internal studies addressed to critical current problems, the Research Staff assists in a related kind of research study, viz, the reconstruction in retrospect of a major development or crisis. After the Cuban crisis of last fall, it was obviously

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important to go back and reexamine all of the evidence bearing on the Soviet decision and action in order to arrive at as clear an understanding as possible of the missile base venture from the Soviet point of view -- in other words, to assess the Russians' reasons for thinking they could get away with it. Having examined the evidence and drawn from the collaborative research of the production offices, the Research Staff did a detailed case study of Soviet policy in action.

5. Depending on the nature of the problem and on the factors of security affecting our sources of information, we believe that a small internal research staff can do certain studies more effectively and more economically than outside government consultants working on contract in a university or research institute. We have analysts whose competence is certainly as great, whose knowledge and experience for our purposes are greater, and whose research and judgment are as dispassionate and objective as that of the specialist outside the government. To do this kind of essential research does require, however, that the Research Staff be relatively free of the daily burden borne by the production offices if it is to perform its service to them.

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